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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the properties of simple rules for reappointment aimed at hold-
ing a public oﬃcial accountable and monitor his activity. The public oﬃcial allocates budget
resources to various activities which results in the delivery of public services to citizens. He has
discretion over the use of resource so he can divert some of them for private ends. Because of a
liability constraint, zero diversion can never be secured in all states. The optimal reappointment
mechanism under complete information is shown to exhibit some leniency thus departing from
the zero tolerance principle. Under asymmetric information (about the state), a rule with ran-
dom verification in a pre-announced subset is shown to be optimal in a class of common rules.
Surprisingly, those common rules make little use of hard information about service delivery when
available. Similarly, PO’s claim about his record is of no value to improve the performance of the
examined rules. In contrast requesting that the PO defends his records publicly can be very use-
ful if the service users can refute false claims with cheap talk complaints: the first best complete
information outcome can be approached in the absence of any observation by the manager of the
accountability mechanism.
JEL: D73, D81, D86, H11
1 Introduction
Typically, we do not observe high power incentive contracts for public oﬃcials and politicians. Most
often the oﬃcial receives a fixed salary and incentive transfers are rare. Instead the decision as to
whether or not to keep the oﬃcial in oﬃce is used to discipline public oﬃcials. Politicians can be ousted
from power by general elections and high level bureaucrats by politicians or bureaucratic procedures.
∗I am grateful to J. Hagenbach, F; Koessler and L. Wren-Lewis for very useful discussions and suggestions.
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The recent developments of the so called transparency and accountability initiatives have come about
because of a great frustration with elections and bureaucratic procedures as the dominating means
for holding politicians and high level bureaucrats accountable for their decisions.1 There is a broad
consensus that those instruments are grossly ineﬃcient in terms of monitoring public oﬃcials and
fighting corruption and that they need to be complemented with novel mechanisms.
Transparency and accountability initiatives have a long tradition in the US (cf. Open Government)
with recent very interesting developments (see e.g., Noveck 2009). There is also a recent fascinating
upsurge of activities in developing countries including India. Partly, this is due to the enactment of
the Right to Information Act, partly to the development of new technologies that allows for innovative
approaches based on web 2.0 technology. For a review of those initiatives see e.g., Posani and Aiyar
(2009). As emphasized in multiple evaluation reports (see e.g., Mc Gee and Gaventa 2010) "we are
facing a serious deficit of understanding of the mechanisms at work in those initiatives which makes
their evaluation hazardous". The present paper aims at contributing to filling this gap.
Accountability is a composite concept. It has been described (see e.g., Malena et al. 2004) as
comprising three elements: "answerability" - the obligation to justify one’s action; "enforcement" -
the sanction if the action or the justification not satisfactory; and "responsiveness" - the willingness
of those held accountable to respond to demand made. The first element is informational, we can
formulate it as the obligation to persuade of the suitability of one’s action upon request. The second
is incentives (or eﬀective sanction). The third element is monitoring. Accountability can be reformu-
lated as a monitoring mechanism that includes an obligation to participate to an ex post persuasion
procedure. As already mentioned the use of incentive is typically very constrained: the wage is fixed
and the sanction is often reduced to "no reappointment". The emphasis in this paper is therefore on
(ex-post) mechanisms that determine how the public oﬃcial (PO) can persuade the citizens that he
deserves reappointment.
The kind of situation that we consider is the provision of public services such as education, health
or any other valuable service to citizens.2 In our model, the provision of public services depends on
the resources the PO allocates to the service as well as on some stochastic (service specific) state of
productivity only observed by the PO. Our main focus is on corruption here described as diversion
of public funds from the provision of public services to private ends. The public oﬃcial has eﬀective
discretion to divert resources because of a liability constraint (the hardest punishment is dismissal)
and because of the just described informational asymmetry. In the absence of any signal of the
PO’s behavior (e.g., performance measure, outcome of verification, announcements, users’ complaints
1Criminal courts are not perceived as alternative either. Partly this is because the process is to much too slow and
very demanding in terms evidence.
2They have been been subject to the so called "social audit" in India (e.g., in Andra Pradesh the National Rural
employement Guarantee Act has been the playground for well documented accountability initiatives).
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etc...) the citizens have no way to prevent a corrupt PO from diverting money: the PO is in eﬀect
not accountable at all for the use of resources.
The question we ask in this paper is whether and how much accountability can be improved
(diversion reduced) when relying on an ex-post mechanisms that generates new information through a
direct verification procedure and through a simple communication game that captures basic features
of social accountability mechanisms encountered in reality. On the one hand we have a PO who
implicitly or explicitly claims that he spends the money properly and always want to be reappointed
in oﬃce. On the other hand we have the citizens who also want to reappoint the PO but only if he
spend the money properly. They know a corrupt PO diverts money unless he is punished for doing
so.3 They have to devise a mechanism to learn about his behavior and sanction it. The most natural
thing that comes to mind is verification i.e., to verify the (explicit or implicit) claims of the PO and
if diversion is detected dismiss the PO. Clearly, if the citizen can verify all the claims, they have
complete information and first-best can be achieved. Systematic verification is not a realistic option
however. Citizens typically lack the necessary time (not to mention willingness) and information
processing capacity. But they could appeal to a professional auditor and pay for his services. In this
paper we do not consider costly verification. One reason - consistent with our concern for corruption
- is that in most LDC there exists no reason to trust independent auditors more than bureaucratic
audit.4 The failure of bureaucratic verification is precisely what triggers the development of citizen
based initiatives: bureaucrats collude with the PO and the PO is expected to collude with an outside
auditor. Therefore instead of costly verification we consider limited verification i.e., only a few -
most of the time only one - service can be verified. The verification is performed by the citizens
themselves: they process the evidence provided by the PO upon their request.5 The question boils
down to the design of a selection rule that determines which one of all the services will be verified.
Our focus is therefore on accountability mechanisms of the form: to persuade the citizens that the PO
did not divert fund and be reappointed, he must provide some evidence specified by the mechanism.
Otherwise, i.e., if he fails to provide the evidence, the citizens believe that he diverted money and he
will be dismissed. The accountability mechanism is announced before the PO makes his allocation
decision. The objective is to minimize diversion (monitoring).
Our first finding is that because of the fixed wage, the first best complete information outcome
exhibits diversion of funds in some states. The optimal accountability mechanism departs from the zero
tolerance principle. Instead, it is characterized by a satisfaction level (a suﬃcient target) above which
the PO is implicitly allowed to divert funds. In the absence of any information about the PO’s behavior,
3 In this paper the term corruption is used in the sense of embezzlement.
4The recent scandals with audting firms e.g., Enron show that even in developed economies, collusion is very diﬃcult
to prevent.
5 In contrast with Rubinstein 2006 we do not let the PO choose which service to provide evidence on.
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the optimal P-rule based on random verification calls for verification in a pre-announced subset of
services. It secures no diversion within the subset if services only. Surprisingly, the availability of
information about the quality of service delivery (a signal of PO’s behavior) is of very little value.
In particular we find that a most intuitive mechanism which consists in a rule that calls for the
verification of one of the services where diversion might have occurred i.e., low quality services, is a
very bad idea. It leads to maximal diversion. The intuition is that such a rule increases the PO’s
cost of refraining from diversion in the first place. Instead diluting detection probability maximally
by diverting whenever possible becomes optimal. We next show that combining random verification
with a necessary performance target weakly improves upon the optimal random verification outcome.
As we investigate the value of communication, we first find that asking the public oﬃcial to defend his
records is of no value in those mechanisms. However, the picture changes dramatically if we introduce
service users and invite them to submit cheap talk complaints. We show that requesting that the
public oﬃcial publicly defends his record when service users can refute his claim can be exploited in
a mechanism that approaches the complete information first best. This result supports the intuition
behind social accountability initiatives. It reveals that a well-designed persuasion game involving the
public can play a significant role in securing the accountability of public oﬃcials and reducing the
extent of corruption. The analysis oﬀers a framework that can be generalized along various dimensions
and provide concrete recommendations as to how new technology can be used to improve governance
in specific contexts.
Related literature
The issue of accountability has been addressed in the political science and political economy
literature (e.g., Persson et al.,1997). The emphasis in that branch of literature is on election rules
and organizational structure. Our approach shares common features with the literature on optimal
monitoring with ex-post verification (cf Townsend 1979, and Gale and Hellwig 1985). In contrast
with e.g., Townsend, we do not consider an explicit cost of verification instead we assume limited
verification resources. Moreover we are interested in the value of communication. This brings us
closer to the persuasion literature (cf. Glazer Rubinstein 2004, 2006). A contribution of this paper
is to introduce moral hazard in a persuasion problem. We show that a persuasion mechanism can be
used to monitor the action of the agent in a (constrained) principal-agent problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the general model is introduced. Section 3 charac-
terizes the complete information first-best benchmark. Section 4 derives the optimal mechanism with
verification in the absence of any observation. Section 5 investigates a number of accountability rules
when information about service delivery is available. Finally, Section 6 develops the full mechanism
with both communication and verification and concluding remarks are gathered in the last section.
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2 The model
There is a finite number  of diﬀerent services in  , which have to be provided to the citizens. To
provide these services, a public oﬃcial (PO) is hired with the task to allocate a budget  to the
provision of these services but the the PO can choose to divert money to private ends instead. For
each service , the quality delivered to the citizens, denoted , is a function of the share of the budget
spent on  and an exogenous and uncertain productivity parameter of the service  :  =  ( )
where  is the share of the budget allocated to service . The quality of each service  can be either
null, low or high,  ∈ {0  }6 where  = 0 is a quality of service below the minimum acceptable
level. A provision of services bellow the minimum level is liable of prosecution.7 The productivity 
of each service is high () with probability  and low () with probability 1− . The technology for
the delivery of the qualities of service is the following:
-  ( ) =  for  ≥  and  = 
-  ( ) =  for    and  =  or  ≥  and  = ;
-  ( ) = 0 for    and  = 
Since the only purpose of allocating money to the production of services is to provide quality with
this technology the choice of  can be simplified to  ∈ ©0  ª and the mandate of the PO simplifies
to spending  (also referred to as a unit of budget) on each service.
8 There are two crucial features
to this production technology:
• The delivery of a low quality service  can result from either spending the appropriate budget on
a low productive service  ¡  ¢ =  or spending 0 (diverting money) on a productive service
 ¡ 0¢ = .
• The amount that the PO can divert (discretionary budget) depends on the state of the world
e.g., in state  = (1 ) with  = for all  = 1  there is no discretionary budget to be
diverted. The PO cannot aﬀord delivering below the minimal level.
The PO’s decision (1  ) consists, for each service , to either spend the share  on service 
denoted  = 0 or to keep the money for himself  = 1. This decision is taken after having observed
the realization of the vector of productivities  = (1     ).
The PO’s objective is to maximize his expected payoﬀ including the money he diverts and the
revenue when remaining in oﬃce
 =X
∈
 +  ()
6The idea is that service users distinguish between three level of services: unacceptable, low and good.
7This captures the idea that it may endanger the life of citizens or deny their basic rights, e.g., the hospital or the
school is kept close.
8This corresponds to the allocation that secures the best value for money.
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where  () is the probability that the citizens, denoted CI, reappoint the PO and  is the (discounted)
continuation wage.9 The probability  () depends on the procedure for reappointment which is the
choice of the CI (see below). The CI wishes to minimize the expected diversion of public budget:
 = 
X
∈
 ()  
In the analysis we also use an alternative but equivalent formulation in terms of saved discretionary
budget.
To discourage the PO from stealing, we assume that the CI can commit to a procedure of reap-
pointment. It involves a rule for verifying the state of productivity and (when unobservable) the
quality of some service(s) and a rule for deciding whether the CI reappoints the PO or dismisses him.
The CI is assumed to only have resources to verify one single service reflecting limited capacities to
process evidence provided by the PO. More formally at the beginning of the period, CI commits to a
persuasion or P-ruleA P-rule is composed of two mappings  and  :
• The first mapping depicts the rule for selecting one service if any for verification:  : 0 → 
where 0 is the information set at time 0: 0 ∈ {Θ×   ×∅××Σ} with Θ denoting the
set of states,  the set of services,  the set of announcements from the PO and Σ the set of
signals from service users10 .  is the set of probability distributions over the elements of  so
(1  ) is a probability vector. With probability  element ( ) is verified, the CI can
only verify one service.
• The second mapping depicts the rule for reappointment We confine attention to deterministic
decision rules of the form:  : 1 → {} with 1 = ©0 ×ª  where  = {0 1} is the set
of outcomes from verification  ∈  where 0 means the PO did not divert and 1 means he
diverted the unit of budget ( ) intended to service .  means reappoint (Keep) and  stands
for dismiss11,12
9The present paper depicts a situation where the budget allocation task is unique but takes place in a long-running
relationship so w is the discounted wage. In a repeated allocation game the discounted income would include future
rents from stealing as well.
10We postpone to section 6 development about Σ
11To the best of our knowledge no public administration uses a stochastic dismissal rule presumably because appealing
to a random device to decide over the fate of people is not politically feasible. Therefore, we focus on deterministic
dismissal rules. The probabilistic character of the mechanism is introduced through verification, signaling or communi-
cation.
12 Interestingly a case where a random device was discussed became wellknown. Under the second world war Brittish
pilots suﬀered great losses because they had to carry a lot of gazoline to be able to fly back. Some smart scientists
showed that expected survival could be increased significantly if instead the pilots were selected randomly and then sent
to a sure death in planes with no gazoline to turn back. The proposal to introduce the new system was unanimously
rejected. Having one’s fate determined by a random device was not acceptable.
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The general timing of the interaction between the PO and the CI is as follows:
(1) The CI publicly commits to a P-rule (a  and a  mapping),
(2) Nature picks the profile of productivities  which is perfectly observed by the PO,
(3) The PO decides on how to spend money on the diﬀerent services, he takes decision (1 2  )  ∈
{0 1} 
(4) Services (1  ) are delivered to the service users which is observed or not by the CI
(5) A message from the PO may be demanded and/or a signal from service users.
(6) A service  is selected and verified according to the P-rule ( mapping).
(7) CI decides whether to keep or dismiss the PO according to  mapping.
Our basic framework is characterized by linear utilities and a liability constraint is imposed: the
largest cost that can be imposed on the PO in case of low quality delivery is dismissal (the loss of ).
We have the following 2 assumptions:
-    meaning that the PO always prefers to divert the whole budget and lose his job rather
than refraining from diverting altogether. But
-    so the PO does not always divert whatever he can.
The two assumptions above can be summarized in a number  ∈ [2 ] such that    whereas

 ( + 1) ≥ ,  is the largest amount of budget shares such that the PO prefers to keep his job rather
than divert  
Definition 1 Let  = max∈ ©;    ª 
The magnitude  () will play a central role in the analysis. We have  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0 For
 large enough or  small enough  = , perfect monitoring is, as we shall see, easily achievable when
relying on verification. The liability constraint i.e., the constraint on "punishments" (losing fixed )
relative to "power" () is what creates the challenge of accountability. We assume that when he is
indiﬀerent between stealing or not the the PO chooses not to.
For the rest of the paper it is useful to introduce the following notation. The set Θ of states θ
is partitioned into classes characterized by the number of high productivity services. We call class-
the element of the partition of Θ where there are exactly  high productivity services and denote this
subset Θ(). The cardinality of Θ() is = !!(−)!  With some abuse of language we shall also be
referring to a PO of type  in the sense of a PO who inherited a state in class() We use the two
formulations interchangeably.
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3 Benchmark: Accountability with full observability
We first look at a particular situation in which the CI actually has access to all the information:
 = Θ× , he observes the productivity state  and the service quality . It follows that CI perfectly
detects any diversion of funds by the PO. A natural candidate for the P-rule (only the -mapping
since no verification is needed) is to dismiss the PO for any amount he steals. We call this P-rule the
zero tolerance rule. We next show that this rule does not perform so well and that CI can do much
better.
With the proposed P-rule the PO is dismissed whether he steals one share or the whole (discre-
tionary) budget since utility increases in stolen money he faces a binary choice: either steal the whole
discretionary budget or steal nothing. We denote by b = P (recall  = 1 if the PO diverts and
 = 0 otherwise) the type  PO’s incentive constraint thus writes13 :
 ≤  (1)
where the rhs is the gain from diverting the discretionary budget and facing dismissal and the rhs
is the gain from allocating according to the mandate. Recall that by assumption we have  ≤ 1
whereas ( + 1)    This means that whenever  ∈ Θ() with  ≤ , the candidate P-rule achieves
full deterrence. However for  ∈ Θ()  ≥  the threat of dismissal induces a PO of type  to steal
the whole discretionary budget since ( + 1)   . In expectation the budget saved from diversion
is equal to
P=
=0  ()  where  () =  { ∈ Θ ()} 14
Now consider a rule where the PO is granted some leniency or a suﬃcient target in the sense that
CI commits to keep the PO if he delivers HQ services whenever possible i.e.,  =  up to a target 
of HQ services. Once the PO has delivered  HQ services, CI is satisfied, he "closes his eyes" so the
PO may unsanctioned steal above the target.
More precisely, suppose that the CI commits to the following rule, the lenient P-rule: for any  ∈
Θ()    the the PO is dismissed for stealing any amount of discretionary budget; and for  ∈
Θ()  ≥  the PO is kept if and only if he delivers at least  services and he is dismissed otherwise.
For the sake of comparison we shall express this rule in terms of the general mechanism. The first
mapping  : Θ× →  is trivial since there is no use to verification because of complete information:
-  (θ s) = (0  0) ∀ θ ∈ Θ and s ∈ S
The second mapping  : Θ× → {} is defined as follows. Let b be defined as # ∈ ;  = :
- ( b b) =  if either b =     or b ≥   ≥  and
13We remind that we call type  PO a PO that faces a state belonging to Θ () that is with a discretionary budget
equal to  
14 () =  { ∈ Θ ()} = !!(−)! (1− )(1−)
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- ( b b) =  if either b   and    or b   and  ≥ 
When he faces this P-rule, the PO chooses how many budget share to divert b, the incentive
constraints of a PO of type  writes
b ≤  for  ≤  (2)b ≤  + ( − )   for b ≤     (3)
since the diversion payoﬀ (lhs) is increasing in b the constraints are most demanding at b = 
respectively b =  Both are satisfied for  ≤  since by definition  ≤ . For  ≤  the PO chooses
not to divert. And for    he chooses to divert exactly  − 
We now integrate the PO’s optimal behavior in CI’s objective function which for convenience we
write in terms of saved expected discretionary budget i.e., the total expected discretionary budget less
the part diverted by the PO15:
  =
=X
=0
 ()  + (1− ())

 (4)
where () =P==0 () so (1− ()) is the probability for the PO to be of type  ≥  The first term
of the expression in (4) is the expected discretionary budget up to class Θ() which is never stolen.
The term is the same as with the zero tolerance rule. The second term is the discretionary budget
associated with the share  of HQ services that must be delivered in states belonging to classes Θ()
with   . This term is absent under the zero tolerance regime. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 With full observability, the “lenient P-rule” with a target ∗ =  achieves
(i) high quality delivery of all productive services in every state in Θ() for    and
(ii) high quality delivery of  productive services in every state in Θ() for  ≥ .
(iii)This rule is optimal under Full Observability.
(vi) In the optimal scheme the expected saved budget is   =P==0  ()  + (1− ()) 
Proof. The optimal lenient P-rule maximizes  subject to the IC constraints,  ≤ maximizes ∆ ∆ =
 ( + 1) +1  + (1− ()  −  ( + 1)   0 so it saturates the constraint and ∗ = 
Proposition 1 characterizes the largest expected utility achievable by the citizens when keeping
the PO accountable for his action. In the following we refer to the outcome in Proposition 1 as the
first-best. It is the best outcome that can be achieved within the institutional constrains captured
by  () that define our problem. For  large enough relative to  we have  () =  so the
first-best in that case corresponds to perfect monitoring The remaining of paper investigates how
15Since the total expeted dscretionary budget is a constant, it is easy to see that the two formulations are equivalent.
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close one may get to the first-best outcome in the absence of complete information. We shall in turn
consider the case when no information is available ex-post, when the CI has information about service
delivery, when he can ask the PO for announcement and receives complaints from service users.
The result in proposition 1 are consistent with Persson et al. (1997). They also find that the
politician must be granted some rents which they call power rents in order to refrain from stealing
the whole budget.
4 Accountability with no information
In this section we look at the case polar to full information: CI does not observe the state of produc-
tivity or the quality of delivered services. We pospone to section 5 and 6 the introduction of messages
from the PO and service users. For the case  = ∅ there is no information to condition verification
probabilities for the diﬀerent services. The −mapping boils down to the set of probability distrib-
utions  p =(1  ) ;P==0  ≤ 1 Since the services are symmetric for the CI, we can focus on
verification rules that treat services symmetrically. The second mapping  :  → {} is trivially
determined: (0) =  and (1) =  The only feasible alternatives make no use of the only available
information i.e., from verification and hence can have no monitoring power whatsoever. In this context
the only decisions for the CI with respect to the P-rule is therefore the selection of the probabilities
for verification of each service and what announces before the PO makes his decisions.
4.1 Random verification procedures
For any given p =(1  )  P  ≤ 1, PO’s objective function writes
 =X
∈
 + (1−
X
;=1
)
so the marginal payoﬀ from stealing on service  is determined by the constant gain  and the expected
loss − Note that the marginal payoﬀ does not depend on whether the PO diverts on other services.
This follows from the linearity of utility in money. The  constraint writes

 −  ≤ 0⇔  ≥

 (5)
Since by assumption   1 we have that the IC constraint requires  ≥ 1  This gives us the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Any P-rule that aims at preventing stealing from service  must have  ≥  
The proof follows immediately from the IC constraint (5). The Lemma allows establishing the
following results
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Proposition 2 i. In any state θ ∈Θ ()   = 1  uniform random verification over the set  of
all services has no monitoring power. A PO of type  ∀ ∈ [0  ] diverts the whole discretionary
budget and is dismissed with probability  ;
ii. For any  ⊂  ; a partial verification rule that entails uniform random verification over a
pre-announced subset  # =  such that  = 1 ≥ 1 for  ∈ secures no stealing in  .
Proof. i. Uniform random verification entails  = 1 for all  but by Lemma 1  must be larger than

 implying   1 . Hence random verification ( = 1∀) violates the IC constraint in all states. In
any state θ ∈ Θ ()  the PO steals  shares of the budget and he is discovered with probability  in
which case he is dismissed.
ii. First note that there is no point in performing verification on  ⊂  if the subset  is not
pre-announced. Indeed since all services are symmetric, the probability for verification for the PO is
then  { ∈}  1 =  1 = 1 which we know by (i) has no monitoring power. When the set 
is pre-announced with  ≥ 1   ≤  we have    for any   ≤  so the PO prefers to spend
the money properly  = 0 ∀  ≤ .
We next derive the optimal APV (pre-Announced Partial Verification) that maximizes CI’s objec-
tive. We want to establish the magnitude of the potential gains from partial verification and the loss
due to asymmetric information.
4.2 Optimal Partial Verification.
Generally, departures from uniform verification over  can take many forms. Simple arguments allows
to narrow down significantly the set of interesting APV however. We know from Proposition 2 that
any candidate optimal rule will feature the property that some services are verified with suﬃcient
probability to deter stealing. Next, since verification is a scarce resource there can be no rationale for
spending it for no good i.e., to verify a service with a probability that is positive but insuﬃcient to deter
stealing. Any optimal use of verification resources must entails that some services are never verified
while other are verified with suﬃciently high probability. We can therefore focus on APV schemes
that pre-announces a partition of the set of services into two subsets and \ =  The set  (for
unverified) contains services that are never verified and the set  contains services that are verified
with equal probability. In the previous section we settled the question regarding the reappointment
rule  It uses the only available information, i.e., the result from the verification procedure in the
most natural way: dismiss if diversion is uncovered and reappoint otherwise. The relevant set of APV
P-rule is:
 : p = (  ) with  = 1   ≤   = 0    and
:  → {}; ( = 0) =  and ( = 1) =  ;  ≤ 
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The question that we next investigate is what is the optimal  = # (recall the services are fully
symmetric)?
Consider a PO of type 0s optimal response to  (). Assume there are 0 ≤  productive
services in  when the state is  ∈ Θ() the PO can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of 0 +  when
diverting from all high productivity services in  . If in addition, the PO can steal some amountb ∈ [0 − 0] where b =P=1 , he gets  = +0  + − . The incentive constraint
for not diverting in  writes
0
  +  ≥
b + 0
  +
− b
  ⇔
1
 −
1
 ≤ 0
The marginal payoﬀ from stealing in  is constant by linearity and equiprobability of verification.
Consequently, if   , we have that   , which implies that the PO prefers to divert from
any service in  that is high productive rather than stealing only from  . Since utility is increasing
in b the PO chooses to steal on every productive service in  , and therefore steals on a total of
0 +  − 0 =  services. If  ≤  utility is a decreasing function of b and the PO chooses to steal
only on productive services in  . We next consider the CI incentives with respect to . In order
to do that we define classes of states and probabilities in the subset  in a way similar to what we
did before. Let 0(;) =  { ∈ Θ (;)} = !!(−)! (1− )−  It is the probability that
θ = (1  ) has  high productivity parameters. We can now express the expected saved budget
for an incentive compatible APV:
  =
=X
=0
0(;)  s.t    (6)
which is unambiguously increasing in , hence ∗ = argmax  = .
Proposition 3 For  = ∅ the optimal partial verification P-rule yields a pre-announced partition of
the set of services into two subsets. The subset subject to verification has cardinality  The expected
saved public funds is   =P==0 0(;) 
ii. In equilibrium the PO is always reappointed, diversion occurs(in subset ) but it is never
uncovered by verification.
Proof. i. The argument about pre-announcement is the same as in Proposition 2. Next, by linearity
of utility, in any state  the PO faces a choice between between stealing the whole discretionary
budget or stealing only from  . The  constraint 0 +  ≥ +
0
  + −  simplifies to  ≤ 
It is independent of the true state. Hence, the same set  of cardinality  minimizes stealing in all
states and thus maximizes the expected saved budget  .
ii. Subset is designed to deter stealing so verification in subset results in  = 0  ∈ [1] and
 (0) =  Since  contains services that are never verified for any   ∈ [+ 1 ] with  =   =
1 the PO diverts the whole discretionary budget in 
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The result in proposition 3 is not surprising. Announced Partial Verification (APV) follows the
same logic as the optimal complete information scheme: it leaves rents in order to avoid full diversion.
In contrast with the complete information setting the P-rule cannot be made conditional on the true
state of productivity (or type of the PO) and on performance. The eﬃciency loss due to asymmetric
information is only partially mitigated by limited (to one item) ex-post verification.
As in the complete information context the impact of the wage and the budget is unambiguous.
Since  ≥ 0 and  ≤ 0 we have 

 ≥ 0 and 

 ≤ 0. As  →    →    so
provided the wage is high enough relative to the budget, in the absence of information full monitoring
is achievable with random verification.
Remark 1 As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 pre-announcement is key to the eﬃciency of APV.
Interestingly practitioners are often reluctant to announce  because they understand that the PO
is given "carte blanche" on the complement subset \ . They often fail to realize that this is the
cost they have to pay to achieve any monitoring eﬀect. Part of the confusion comes from the fact
the eﬃciency of verification and audits is often measured in terms of unveiled diversion i.e., from an
ex-post perspective. While the optimal APV never unveils any diversion even though diversion occurs
systematically. In this context CI must credibly resist the temptation to verify outside of pre-announced
M. So CI’s commitment to an APV scheme can turn out a demanding feature.
4.2.1 Evaluating the performance of the optimal APV
The first point is that it increases the expected saved budget from 0 with random verification to
   0 Yet, there is of course a cost to asymmetric information. Comparing   ∗ =P=
=0 0(;)  with the complete information optimal outcome   =
P=
=0 ()  + (1 −
 ())  we see that the first term of the two expressions are quite similar but since ()  0(;)
because 0() is the probability for θ belonging to Θ (;) with  ⊂  we haveP==0 0(;)  P=
=0 ()  Moreover, partial verification cannot prevent full stealing in the complementary set
 while under full information,  HQ services can be guaranteed in good states (1 −  ())  So
partial verification does much better than uniform random verification but much less well than the
optimal complete information P-rule. Interestingly the performance of the optimal APV resembles
the performance of the zero tolerance P-rule under complete information  =P==0  ()  . It is
smaller though since ()  0(;)
5 Accountability with observable service delivery
In this section we investigate a number of natural P-rules feasible when information about service
delivery is available. We start with a simple target rule with no verification. We next consider two
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types of conditional APV rule. In the first, the choice as to whether or not to carry out verification
on a pre-announced set depends on service delivery. In the second, verification always takes place but
the set of services subjected to verification depends on available information about service delivery.
Finally, we consider the value of using PO’s claim about his record.
For the case when 0 =  so the set of P-rules is characterized  :  →  and  :  ×  →
{}  Potentially this set is very large. We here focus on rules that makes use of ex-post information
in a simple way.16 More precisely we focus on P-rules of the form  ( b) with b = #  ∈ ;  = 
i.e., we allow the probability of verification to depend on the own delivery status (i.e., HQ or LQ)
while the delivery status of the other services aﬀect the probability through an aggregate measure onlyb the total sum of HQ services.17 Similarly, we limit attention to decision rules  :  × → {}
of the form  ( b ) 
5.1 Focused verification
In this section we consider the possibly most intuitive P-rule that uses ex-post information: focus
verification resources on LQ services since only they may hide diversion. We call it focused random
verification (FV). It entails that the set of services subjected to random verification is determined by
observed service delivery. More formally
-  :  →  ;  ( b) = 1− for  =
and  ( b) = 0 for  = 
 :  × → {}; (b 0) =  and (b 1) =  ∀b.
The IC constraint applying to the choice of the budget allocation decisions  is derived by com-
paring the payoﬀ when complying marginally i.e., not stealing  = 0 given b− (the amount of
diversion from other services). In any state θ ∈ Θ ()  given the value of the other allocation variables
−; P∈−  = b− the choice is between x=0 = (10  ) and x=1 = (11  )  denoteb0 =P∈−   b1 =P∈− +1 b0 and b1 are defined as the corresponding sums of HQ services:
b0 + (1−  (b0; )) ≤ b1 + (1−  (b1; )) (7)
where  (b0; ) is the detection probability in class  when stealing is equal to b0 Eq. (7) simplifies
to [ (b1 )−  (b0 )]   which says that the expected marginal loss in terms of increased
probability for detection times the continuation wage must exceed the (sure) gain The new feature
compared with previous P-rules is that the change in the probability for detection and dismissal is a
function of the whole vector of budget allocations summarized in b. In the P-rule under consideration,
16This can be justified appealing to the practical applications.
17We cannot preclude that complexe conditional schemes that make use of more sophisticated information e.g., the
precise combination of the vector of delivery could achieve a better outcome.
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the probability for detection depends on the number of LQ services which is  − b The probability
for detection associated with b =  − b in state  ∈ Θ () is
 (b; ) = b−  + b
We take the derivative18 with respect to b : () = −(−+)2 ≥ 0 and 2()2 = −2 −(−+)3  0
i.e., the detection risk increases with the total amount stolen but at a decreasing rate. This implies
that, in any given class, it may not be IC to steal a single unit, but if it is IC to steal some amount
of units, it is optimal to steal the whole discretionary budget. The PO’s optimal response is therefore
again in terms of a binary choice. We also have that (;) =

(−+)2  0 so the better the state
(larger ) the larger the marginal detection risk for any given amount of stolen units. This means that
if it is optimal to comply in class () it is optimal to comply in any state belonging to Θ (0)  0   In
each state the IC writes i terms of the binary choice:
[ ( )−  (0 )]  

 

  ⇔  ≤ 
which turns out to be independent of  and which we know is violated We have the following result:
Proposition 4 A P-rule that focuses all verification resources on observed LQ services has no mon-
itoring power whatsoever. In all states the PO steals the whole discretionary budget.
Proof: See above.
The result in Proposition 5 may at first appear quite surprising because focusing verification on LQ
services since the HQ services need not be checked at all seems common sense. The result reveals an
essential limitation in the use of information about services in ex-post verification random mechanisms
to monitor the PO. Indeed in any given class, focused verification reallocates the marginal probability
of detection from states with a lot of stealing (and many LQ) to states with less stealing (and few
LQ). The marginal detection risk decreases with the number of stolen units which creates perverse
incentives. As a consequence the FV P-rule does not relax the liability constraint and therefore it has
no more monitoring power than random verification.
Remark 2 Again the failure of common sense intuition about the value of focused verification reveals
a conflict between the ex-post perspective of verification as an instrument to detect diversion and the
ex-ante perspective of verification as an instrument to monitor action i.e., to minimize diversion.
18For simplicity we do as if PO’s choice was continuous. This has no impact on the qualitative results
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The conflict is due to the fact that the quality of service delivery is an imperfect signal of diversion,
relying on it for verification makes the monitoring power of verification manipulable by the PO. It
creates new incentives to divert i.e., to dilute the probability for being caught.
5.2 Performance target and verification
5.2.1 Simple performance target rules
Although the focus of the paper is on P-rule with information revelation. We provide some results
about a simplest rule using information about service delivery with no verification. The first mapping
 :  →  is void since no verification is performed:  (s) = (0  0) ∀ s ∈ S The second mapping
 :  → {} is defined as follows: (b) =  if b ≥  and ( b) =  if b   where  is a pre-
announced target In plain language, the P-rule boils down to a decision determined by the number
of high quality services: if he meets the target, the PO is reappointed, if it does not he is dismissed.
The PO’s incentives depends on the state  as follows: if  ∈ Θ () with    the PO’s payoﬀ
writes b
 + (; b) b ≤ 
where b = P is the number of services where the PO steals. Since the P-rule for b   entails
(; b) = 0 ∀b the payoﬀ boils down to  which is trivially maximized at b =  So when the
target is not feasible (  ) the PO diverts the whole discretionary budget. In states  ∈ Θ () with
 ≥  and since (; b) = 0 for  − b   and (; b) = 1 for  − b ≥  the IC constraint
induced by the target rule in those states is
 − 
  +  ≥

 (8)
which simplifies  ≥  As we know this is satisfied for  ≤  Hence for  ≤  in all  ∈ Θ ()
with  ≥  the PO will deliver any target  ≤  and steal the whole budget for any target    The
outcome will then be exactly the target in all states where it is achievable and LQ service everywhere
else.
Recalling our notation  () =  { ∈ Θ ()} = !!(−)! (1− )− and () =
P=
=0 () is
the probability that the target is not feasible After substituting for the PO’s optimal response CI’s
objective to maximize saved budget writes
max
=X
=
 ()  = max (1− ()) 
  ≤ 
Denote by ∗ the largest integer value of  that maximizes the programme above. We derive wrt 
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
 [(1− ()) ] = (1− ()) − 0 ()  using the definition of  () : 1 −
P=−1
=0 () −  () =
 ()  ⇔ 1−P=−1=0 () = (1 + )  ()
This gives us the following result
Proposition 5 i. The optimal target P-rule entails a target ∗ = min { argmax (1− ()) } ;
ii. In equilibrium the PO delivers ∗ high quality services iﬀ  ∈ Θ () with  ≥ ∗ while he steals
the whole discretionary budget whenever  ∈ Θ () with   ∗;
iii. the optimal target P-rule yields a total saved budget of   = (1− (∗)) ∗ 
Proof. See above
The optimal target rule trades oﬀ the loss of the whole budget in states where the target is
not feasible with the gain of an additional unit in states where the target is feasible. Comparing
  = (1− (∗)) ∗  with the full information case   =
P=
=0  ()  − (1 −  ()) , we
note that the first term of   representing the gain in the worse states is fully absent with the
target rule;  the second term is quite similar in structure but ∗ ≤  because the CI trades oﬀ the
loss of the whole budget in states where the target is not feasible against the level of requested service
delivery where it is feasible.19
Remark 3 The target rule is a simple and transparent P-rule. A major drawback is that it induces
diversion in all states but  ∈ Θ (∗) and poor states are worst hit.
In the Appendix we show how a non-deterministic reappointment rule based on target can be used
to achieve the complete information payoﬀ but at the cost of turning perverse.
5.2.2 Verification conditional on performance with respect to target
In this section we investigate simple composite P-rules that combine target with a verification proce-
dure. Two variants are of interest. The first amounts to imposing a necessary target so if the target
is met the CI proceeds to some verification but if it is not the PO is dismissed. The second type of
rule imposes a suﬃcient target so if the target is met the PO is reappointed while if the target is not
met the CI proceeds to verification.
Verification with necessary target Since we know that random verification has no monitoring
power (see Proposition 2) we address the case of partial verification (equal probability check in ⊂ )
with necessary target. Specifically, partial verification with target is as follows:
19The question of interest is whether the optimal target rule improves upon the optimal APV :
==∗  () 
∗
  ≥ ()
==0 0(;∗)  which is equivalent to comparing
==  () ∗ and
==0 0(;∗) where
∗( ) and∗ ()  The relative value of the two rules to depend on  and  Intuitively, the target rule will outperform
the APV rule when  is large for given  In contrast the PA rule may be better when  large.
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The necessary target P-rule is defined as follows  :  →  with  ( b) :
-  (; b ≥ ) = 1  for  ≤   (; b ≥ ) = 0 for   ;
-  (; b  ) = 0 ∀
The second mapping  :  × → {} is defined as follows:
- (b ) =  if b ≥  and  = 0 and
- ( b) =  otherwise i.e., if b   or if b ≥   = 1.
Recalling Proposition 5ii. we know that if  ∈ Θ ()     the target cannot be met and
the PO steals the whole discretionary budget  since he will be dismissed anyway. For the case
 ∈ Θ ()   ≥  consider two situations. Let as before 0 ≤  be the number productive services in
 when the state is  ∈ Θ(). Then if ( − 0) ≥  there are enough high quality services in  to
meet the target, the reasoning is similar to partial verification without target (APV), if  ≤  the
PO only steals in 
If ( − 0)   (but  ≥ ) the PO needs to abstain from stealing on a number  =  − ( − 0)
of high productive services in  in order to meet the target. Since not meeting the target leads to
dismissal, IC for securing the target is :
 − 
  +  ≥
b

since the position of services does not matter we write ( − ) as the number of services that he can
steal from unsanctioned (this implies not stealing in ) the rhs is increasing in b so we can focusb =  , the inequality simplifies to   . Hence, when ( − 0)   (but  ≥ ) the reasoning is
similar to the simple target rule and PO prefers to secure the target and steal what is left to steal in
 than steal any larger amount provided  ≤ 
Compared with APV, the impact of the target is twofold: i. it secures at least  HQ services in all
states where that is feasible and thus even in states where  − 0   which APV fails to achieve; ii.
That comes at a cost of losing the whole budget in states where   
 = (1− ())  +
=X
=
0(;) −   (9)
where we remind 0(;) =  { ∈ Θ (;)} it is the probability that θ = (1  ) has  high
productivity parameters. The first thing is that for  ≤  the target is secured whenever feasible (first
term in 9). In addition some additional HQ service may be secured if they happen to be in excess of
 and in  We note that ∗∗ that maximizes (9) is smaller that ∗ of the optimal simple target rule
since the second terms decreases with  We have the following porposition:
Proposition 6 Optimal Partial verification with target entails
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i. the same pre-announced verification set as partial verification without target and a lower target
than the simple target scheme. Partial verification with target
ii. strictly improves upon the simple target scheme and
iii. weakly improves upon the partial verification scheme.
Proof :
i. This follows from proposition 3, the IC constraint within the set  does not depend on the true
state and thus does not depend on whether the target is met or not.
ii. This follows from the fact that the expression in (9) has the same structure as (??) but with an
additional positive term. In particular, the optimal target of the simple rule ∗ is feasible and yields
a larger saved budget.
iii. Consider the case with high wage i.e., when  tends to  in that case imposing a target
  0 only brings forth the loss of the discretionary budget in poor states (  ) so ∗ = 0. In
contrast for  small e.g.,  = 1 implying  = {1}  the gain from the target  = 1 comes with large
probability (1− (1)) = 1− (1− ) overweighting the cost of not meeting the target which comes
with a vanishing small probability (1− ).
Proposition 6 shows that the use of ex-post information by means of a necessary target to comple-
ment partial verification has some limited value. It is expected to improve accountability in context
where the wage is very low relative to the budget i.e., in context where "first best" diversion is very
high. On the other side, the simple target rule can be unambiguously improved upon by combining it
with a verification procedure.
Verification with suﬃcient target In this section we address the case of partial verification
(equal probability check in  ⊂ ) with suﬃcient target. The distinction with the mechanism in the
preceding section is that here fulfilling the target secures reappointment. Failing to meet the target
does not trigger dismissal instead CI proceeds with a verification procedure. The necessary target
P-rule is defined as follows  :  →  with  ( b) :
-  (; b ≥ ) = 0 ∀
-  (; b  ) = 1   ≤   (; b ≥ ) = 0   
The second mapping  :  × → {} is defined:
- (b ) =  if b ≥  or if b   and  = 0;
- (b ) =  otherwise i.e., if b   and  = 1.
In any state  ∈ Θ ()     the PO faces the APV scheme described in Section 4.1 and 4.2. We
know that if  ≤  the PO only steals in  . So the outcome is the same outcome as with APV.
In states  ∈ Θ ()   ≥  the PO’s chooses between delivering  services (and stealing  − ) or
stealing b  −  and facing partial verification. If all high productivity services are in  the target
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rule allows him to steal  −  in  and skip the verification which is worse than the APV outcome.
Conversely, if all high productivity services are in  the PO has no incentive to deliver any HQ and
he will face the verification in  and be reappointed while stealing all the discretionary budget. So
that is the same as in APV. The interesting cases are when not all  high productivity services are in
either subsets. Consider now the case when some of the  high productivity services are in  in the
sense that delivering  HQ requires refraining from stealing in  The PO chooses between delivering
the target and skipping the verification. Or failing the target and facing the verification in  Since
delivering the target requires the delivery of more productivity service than there are in the choice
is obvious because the PO can secure reappointment when failing the target but complying in  He
gains nothing from complying with the target. We summarized this reasoning:
Proposition 7 A P-rule that combines a suﬃcient target with partial verification does strictly worse
for any   0 than the partial verification rule without target.
Proof : see above
This result is somehow surprising because contrary to intuition oﬀering an opportunity to skip the
verification has no incentive value whatsoever in this context.
This section does not oﬀer a complete investigation of the value of using information about services
quality for accountability. Nevertheless procedures involving verification and a performance target
are indisputably most relevant classes of accountability mechanisms. The results in Prop. 5-7 show
significant limitations in the use of information about service delivery for accountability. An intuition
for this result is that conditioning verification on the performence opens up gaming opportunity.
First and in contrast with most analyzed persuasion situations, we are dealing with moral hazard in
addition to adverse selection. Second, verification ressources are limited. As a consequence the public
oﬃcials has an incentive to take action that aﬀect performance in order to manipulate detection risk.
This is in particularly clear in the case of focused verification (Proposition 5). It also underlies the
reasoning behind proposition 7. We next show that the same intuition is behind the absence of value
for accountability of announcements made by the public oﬃcial.
5.3 On the role of announcements
We here discuss the value of requesting an announcement from the PO about the state of productivity
and/or service quality. In the terminology of communication theory we now have an explicit sender,
the PO and a receiver the CI. The question we ask is can communication improve upon the APV
outcome by using these announcements?
Observable service delivery
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Consider first the case with observable service delivery. We focus on announcement that are
consistent with the observed vector of service delivery and with the production technology. Such
announcements may either bring no new element e.g., announce e = when  = and e =  when
 = . Or PO eﬀectively announces that he diverted if he claims e =  when  = for some .
We start with claims relating to services in  and assume he claims e =  when e =, for some
 ∈  In response to such a claim the P-rule may call either for an increase of the verification
probability  or leave it unchanged.20 Assume first the verification scheme is left unchanged. The
reappointment rule must dismiss the PO if verification confirms the claim so diversion took place
otherwise it would open a way to steal unsanctioned. The reappointment rule may or may not sanction
lies i.e., if verification disconfirm the claim so  6=  so PO did not steal but he lied. Whether it is
truthful so he diverted or if he lied but the CI does not change the probabilities, such a claim can never
be optimal for the PO and it is strictly dominated if lying is sanctioned. If the mechanism reacts by
increasing the verification probability, the claim can be used to manipulate CI’s verification resource
toward low productivity services   1 and away from high productivity   1 thereby reducing
the chance to detect diversion and violating the IC constraint on those services. The same reasoning
applies to a policy that would reduce verification probability. But that can never be optimal for the
CI.
Now how about an announcement with some e =  when e =,  ∈ ? If the CI verifies with
positive probability but sanctions lies (and diversion of course), there can be no point for PO to make
such a claim. If the claim is true he will be dismissed and if it is false he will be dismissed as well.
If CI verifies with positive probability but does not sanction lies then, PO will use the claim e = 
when e = when either ¡ ¢ (so he won’t be sanctioned for diversion) to dilute the verification
probability in  and the whole scheme breaks down. So CI could either only request announcement
in  or discard announcement in  i.e., allowing PO to claim that he diverted without CI imposing
any sanction.
If the mechanism does not react by changing verification probabilities (because that can be ma-
nipulated) or sanctioning lies (because the PO would never make untruthful announcement where
verification would not lead to dismissal but of course would lie when he diverts) than announcements
eﬀectively play no role.
Service delivery non-observable
Here too we focus on consistent claims that is claims of the form
¡ ¢ ¡ ¢  Inconsistent
claims can be either punished or discarded. We note that if either claim induces a change in the
probabilities for detection, PO can and will use it to manipulate CI in order to reduce detection
20We note that it is trivially precluded to respond to a "confession" by dismissal since the PO would then never make
such claim.
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probability from services where he diverted. For instance if CI verifies
¡ ¢ claims in  more often
than
¡ ¢ claims (or the other way around) the IC will be violated for some services in  The
argument also applies if a claim prompt a verification in  Hence again we see that there is no value
for announcement in this context.
This short discussion suggests that explicit claims have no role to play in the APV. At least in terms
of monitoring. This echoes the results about the value of using information about service delivery.
But there may be a value of announcement in terms of the legitimacy of the sanction in case the PO
announces he did not divert but diversion is detected and therefore also lying.
6 Social Accountability
In the previous sections we have established that there could only be limited gain to the use of
information about service delivery in the accountability mechanisms that we investigated. In this
section we introduce a new instrument that is rapidly spreading: service users’ complaints. The idea
is to make use of service users’ superior information about the true state. We assume that service
users are (with some probability) able to identify the reasons for the low quality of a service. They
can see when e.g., a school is dysfunctionning because the teachers do not receive their wage i.e.,
basic resources fail to accrue to the school - a situation that corresponds to a high productive state
denied resources. They can distinguish that from a situation where only part of the teacher positions
have been filled or the teachers have very low qualification - a situation that corresponds to a low
productivity state. We do not model service users explicitly at this stage. We do however conjecture
that the results will hold for strategic service users with preferences suﬃciently alined with those of
the CI.
The objective of this section is to show that when the CI has access to service users’ complaints,
requesting that the CI makes a public claim of his records allow for significant improvement in ac-
countability in a context of asymmetric information.
6.0.1 Social accountability
We shall consider the case when the vector of service delivery is not observable by the CI. The
mechanism requests that the sender, PO "defends his records": makes a consistent announcement
about both the productivity and the quality of each service. Thereafter, the service users are invited
to complain i.e., to refute the announcement with respect to well-identified services if they believe it
is untrue. The refutation is cheap talk and service users do not provide hard evidence. We assume
that they are sincere but they may be lazy and/or mistaken. A concern of practical relevance is that
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the P-rule is little demanding of service users.21
Complaints are used to generate a signal, we shall not go into the details on how the signal is
obtained. The idea is that a suitable algorithm aggregates the complaints received from service users
e.g., on an electronic platform. We will show that there exists a P-rule using both announcements
and complaints such as to approach the first-best outcome.
The communication phase of the game takes place after the PO made its allocation decision (see
the timing in section 2). It includes a public message or claim from the PO and response from service
users who may refute the claim. Let  : {=0}   =
³e e´ be the set of claims. The PO is requested
to declare a state of productivity and a quality level for each service. We restrict the set of acceptable
claims to consistent (technically feasible) ones and we denote by  any claim that confess diversion
i.e., irrespective of the combination and the extent of diversion. After having seen the claim, the
service users privately post complaints on the platform. The set of acceptable complaints is denoted
. The platform accepts two types of complaints:
• Type 1: the PO claims the productivity and service quality is high  =
³e e´ = ¡ ¢  but
user  posts a complaint (1) () = ( ) i.e., contending ( ) = ( ). Type 1 complaints
are not related to diversion and they are assumed perfect signals.22
• Type 2: the PO claims
³e e´ = ( ) while service user  contend that ( ) = ¡ ¢  i.e.,
(2) () =
¡ ¢. Type 2 complaints implicitly suggest diversion occurred, they may with some
probability be mistaken.
All other messages by service users are discarded by the platform that processes the announcement
and the acceptable complaints to produce a signal
 : ×  → Σ  = (b ∗)
The first term b = #e; e =  and such # () = 0 ∀ i.e., no complaint of any kind was posted
on announced HQ service  b is a signal about the number of high quality services. The second
term, ∗is a signal about which service is most likely to have been the object of diversion: ∗ ∈
argmax
³
(2)   (2)
´
where (2) is the complaint score (e.g., number of complaints) of service 23
It is (one of) the service(s) that has received the largest amount of type 2 complaints. For the case
(2) = 0 for all  ∗ =  ∈  it does not correspond to any service.
21We return to this issue at the end of the section where we discuss alternative ways to implement the outcome.
22A false claim that evrything is fine when it is not is very easy to identify and there will always be a service users
outraged by the lie who complains.
23All services are assumed to have an equal number of users and those users have an equal propensity to complain
and they are identical with respect to their accuracy.
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Finally, let  = ({ = } ∪ © = ª ;  = ∗),  ≤ 1 is the probability that the PO diverted
on service  conditional on service  having received the highest complaint score. It captures the
informativeness of ∗ = 1 implies that ∗is a perfect signal. For simplicity we let  be independent
of the total amount of diverted budget.24
The idea of the P-rule is as follows. For the case the PO admits that he diverted funds  = , he
is fired without verification. If  6=  the following applies. If the announced and uncomplained about
delivery performance is good i.e., b ≥  for some  to be defined, no verification will be performed.
Otherwise verification occurs on ∗ (one of) the service most subjected to type 2 complaints. If the
announced performance is poor b   verification will always take place on ∗. More precisely the
complete Social Accountability P-rule (SAP) is as follows:
 : ×Σ→  entails
-  (;  = ) = 0 ∀
-  (b ∗;  6= ) = 0 if b ≥  ∀;
-  (b ∗;  6= ) = 1 if b   and  = ∗;
-  (b ∗;  6= ) = 0 if  6= ∗
 : ×Σ×∗ → {} is defined as follows:
- (  ∗) =  if  6=  b   and ∗ = 0 or b   and
- (  ∗) =  otherwise i.e., if  =  or b   and ∗ = 1.
We next investigate the PO incentives to take actions and make announcements in response to this
P-rule for some pre-announced target . We shall proceed by backward induction. We distinguish
between two regions of the state space depending on whether the target  is feasible or not: Region
1: θ ∈ ∪Θ−1=0 () and Region 2: θ ∈ ∪Θ= () 
Region 1: A PO of type   
We first consider PO’s choice of announcement. Note that there can be no point in announcing
 =  since the PO is then dismissed with probability 1. This means that for any b  0 ∗ 6=  the
announcement eﬀectively hides the truth on at least b services. Next, whatever b and whatever  ∈ b ≤  because    will be refuted since there cannot be  services not complained about (which
would lead to automatic reappointment) because   25 So the PO may just as well announce 
such that b(#e  = ) =    The platform will always produce a signal  with b   The P-rule
will induce the verification of ∗ ∈  with probability  PO is detected and loses his job. Since the
risk of detection is independent of the number of diverted shares, the PO faces a binary choice i.e.,
24 It is a research task in itself to design the information processing algorythm to make best use of the information in
the complaints. We here only consider a very simple technology.
25Recall that by assumption type 1 complaints are perfect signals.
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whether or not to divert the whole discretionary budget i.e., b =  :

 + (1− )  ⇔

   (10)
within the set of states the most demanding constraint is at  = − 1 Using earlier results, implying
that for the IC to be satisfied we need  ≤  + 1
We conclude that for a PO of type    refraining from diversion and announcing the truth is
optimal providing  ≤  + 1. We note however that what announcement concerns the equilibrium
is not unique. In fact any  6=  will induce b   and is consistent with a no stealing equilibrium
in Region 1. So in particular the PO can overstate or understate performance (and the state of
productivity). If however there is some positive value in showing that no service user complained,
truth-telling dominates.
Region 2: A PO of type  ≥ 
If PO announces  such that b ≥  so at least  services announced as high quality have not
been refuted, it means that diversion is limited to b ≤  −  The PO is then reappointed without
verification. While if b   suggesting b  − there will be verification and detection with probability
With the same reasoning as above the choice is binary between diverting unsanctioned (−)units
or with risk the whole discretionary budget,  units IC writes:
 − 
  +  

 + (1− ) (11)

 −   0
which is satisfied for  ≤ . So, for  ≤  it is optimal for the PO to divert on b∗ =  −  to
announce some  such that b ≥  and since  =  triggers dismissal, he will not be truthful on the
− services where he diverts. So in equilibrium we have untruth announcement and complaints that
do not lead to verification.
The CI’s objective function writes
max 
 =
=X
=0
 ()  + (1− ())

 s.t.  ≤ 
which is maximized at ∗ =  the calculus is the same as in the complete information case.
This gives us the following results. Let  denote the informativeness of the signal generated by the
user’s complaints,
Proposition 8 A P-rule using user complaints and announcements can achieve
(i) high quality delivery of all productive services in every state in Θ() for    and
(ii) high quality delivery of  services in every state in Θ() for  ≥ .
(iii) In equilibrium the expected saved budget is   =P==0  ()  + (1− ()) 
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Proof: The proof follows from the reasoning above.
Corollary 1 In the absence of PO announcement, a P-rule built on complaints alone allows detecting
diversion with probability  independently of the state. Such a P-rule fails to deter diversion in any
state belonging to Θ ()   ≥ 
Proof. The logic of proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 showing the optimally of leniency. Even
where  = 1 the delivery of more than  services can never be obtained. In good states    the PO
prefers to divert everything and leave.
Proposition 8 and it Corollary establish that a P-rule that uses information from service users and
the PO’s announcements can approach the complete information outcome. The role of the announce-
ment in a context where refutation can be obtained from service users, is to make possible a state
contingent leniency rule in a way similar to the optimal full information scheme. This contrasts with
APV where leniency is state independent i.e., it applies fully and within the pre-announced subset
 With PO announcement and refutations, the leniency rule applies only in states where the target
is feasible. The SAP (Social Accountability P—rule) secures full compliance (no diversion) in states
θ ∈ ∪Θ∗=0 () and it secures at least  services in θ ∈ ∪Θ= ()  So because SAP is state depend,
for  close to 1, it dominates the APV even in the absence of announcement (Corollary). The role
of complaints is further to guide verification so as to optimize the use of verification ressources. The
imperfect informativeness of the signal ∗ bounds away the outcome for the first-best.
The result in Proposition 8 is consistent with Lipman and Seppi (1995). The parties involved in
communication that is the PO and the service users have conflicting interests26 with respect to the
CI’s decision about reappointment in some state of the world i.e., when the PO has diverted money
from the provision of services. If the service users were able to prove their counter claim, the failure of
the service users to refute PO’s claim with respect to any service could be used as suﬃcient evidence
to prove that the claim is true. No verification by the CI would then be needed. In our context
users’ complaints are not hard evidence. Instead they are used to guide verification to provide the
evidence of diversion. Another issue is that in our context the CI does not care about truth per se.
What he cares about is diversion. So in particular false claims that do not hide diversion can be
used to manipulate verification as we already noted in section 5.4. By distinguishing between (type
1) complaints against false "good news" hiding low productivity state with low quality service from
(type 2) complaints that may hide diversion, the SAP-rule contains PO’s incentives to falsly claim
good news.
The result in Proposition 8 also underlines the significance of the informativness of the signal
produced by the platform. An immediate recommendation is for the CI to devise a platform which
26We identify the service users’ interest with those of the CI.
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processes information so as to generate the most informative signal about diversion.
Finally, it should be noted that the reliance on communication i.e., claims and refutations is related
to a concern for simplifying service users’ contribution. The same outcome could be implemented
without PO claims but with a more sophisticated participation of service users. Instead of the PO
making definite claims, the CI would communicate to service users the "principles for PO proper
behavior in every situation" and would ask to report deviations from those principles for every service.
Obviously, such a scheme is much more demanding of service users compared to the SAP which only
expects a refutation of an explicit claim. Given that service users’ participation both with respect
to sophistication and intensity is an issue in practice, the SAP that builds on communication is of
greater practical relevance.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper is concerned with a situation where a public oﬃcial has been delegated the task to allocate
resources for the production and delivery of public services. But he may divert money to his own
pocket. The institutional context is characterized by a fixed wage and limited liability: the public
oﬃcial may at worst be dismissed.
We are interested in the monitoring value of a number of ex-post accountability mechanisms i.e.,
persuasion rules that rely on limited verification resources and may use communication.
Our first finding is that because of the fixed wage, the first best complete information outcome
exhibits diversion of funds in some states. The optimal accountability mechanism departs from the zero
tolerance principle. Instead, it is characterized by a satisfaction level (e.g., a number of high quality
services) above which the PO is implicitly allowed to divert funds. In the absence of any information
about the PO’s behavior, the optimal P-rule based on random verification calls for verification in
a pre-announced subset of services. Surprisingly, the availability of information about the quality of
service delivery (a signal of PO’s behavior) is of little value. In particular we find that a most intuitive
mechanism which consists in a rule that calls for the verification of services where diversion might
have occurred i.e., low quality services is a very bad idea. It leads to maximal diversion. The intuition
is that such a rule increases the PO’s cost of refraining from diversion in the first place. Instead
diluting detection probability maximally by diverting whenever possible becomes optimal. We show
that combining random verification with a necessary performance target weakly improves upon the
optimal selective random verification outcome. But we find that asking the public oﬃcial to defend
his records is of no value in those mechanisms. However, the picture changes dramatically as we
introduce service users and invite them to submit cheap talk complaints. We show that requesting
that the public oﬃcial publicly defends his record when service users can refute his claim can be
27
exploited in a mechanism that approaches the complete information first best. This result supports
the intuition behind social accountability initiatives. It reveals that a well-designed persuasion game
involving the public can play a significant role in securing the accountability of public oﬃcials and
reducing the extent of corruption.
The analysis oﬀers a framework that can be generalized along various dimensions to provide con-
crete recommendations as to how new technology can be used to improve governance.
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APPENDIX
8 Target rule with non-deterministic reappointment rule
The rule is as follows:
 :  → ∆ {} :
-  (b) =  b ≥ 
-  (b) = min©1  ª + ¡1−min©1  ª¢ for b  
The PO’s payoﬀ writes
 = b +min©1 − ª implying   0 for    so b∗ = 0 and   0 for  ≥  The P-rule
achieves the first best complete information outcome :b∗ = max {0  − }.
This scheme features a number of highly unattractive features. In particular
- In equilibrium an honest but unlucky PO is systematically dismissed while a (lucky) PO who
diverts is never dismissed.
- The lower the wage, the smaller  and the more often the (honest) PO is dismissed.
This means that dismissal is not a signal of embezzlement but of honesty! As a consequence
the assumption that the PO loses (his continuation wage)  because after dismissal he finds no
job is not sustainable. Especially with a high turnover: unlucky PO will be easily hired again which
reduces the diﬀerential continuation wage when remaining in oﬃce. This in turn means a large extent of
equilibrium embezzlement (−)  since  ≤ 0. Thus we see that a non-deterministic reappointment
rule may achieve first-best but at the cost of providing the wrong signals which undermines the
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incentive power of the threat of dismissal. This complements the argument made in the Introduction
for confining attention to deterministic reappointment rules.
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